Jiblog is the intellectual repository of a Midwestern, gas guzzlin', beer chuggin', one woman lovin', son of a bitch conservative.
Wednesday, July 23, 2008
Motivations Behind the Iraq Plans
For most Americans, the 16 month plan is very seductive. Americans are not a war loving lot despite their willingness to fight for security and liberty. The Long War has been exactly that, and the fatigue in the general populace is palpable.
In addition to fatigue, there is this notion that pulling out now, while Iraq is stabilized, is a chance to make a legitimate claim to victory over the insurgency in Iraq. A quick pull out may very well allow that claim to be staked.
The long range plan proves to be a much more difficult sell. A fatigued public cannot fathom a significant U.S. military presence in Iraq that lasts until 2012 or 2020. Long term military deployments such as this are just not something that Americans have historical experience with.
If you listen to Iraq's Defense Minister, that long range presence is exactly what we will need in order to claim a victory that the history books will recognize. He says that it will be 2012 before Iraq can even handle all of its own internal security, and that it may be 2020 before the country can reliably protect itself from external threats. If his estimates are correct, a 16 month pull out, while possibly giving the U.S. a tenuous claim to victory, would leave the current Iraqi state horribly vulnerable to internal and external calamity.
So which plan is best? Well, the answer just may lay in your motivation. If you have a short term outlook, then getting our troops out of harms way with a veneer of victory is likely the goal. The future of the nation at the crossroads of the Middle East is wrought with peril in this outlook, but it is nothing if not expedient.
On the other hand, if a stable, allied state in the heart of the Middle East is the goal, then there is little choice but to stay until such time that the Iraqi government can successfully provide it's most important service to the Iraqi people: Providing internal and external security for the Iraqi people. Additionally, if Iraq's long term viability and prosperity is a goal, then long range basing rights a la Germany and Japan must be negotiated with the Iraqi government. The presence of a U.S. base(s), while perhaps not always popular, would have a tempering affect on internal Iraqi instability while acting as a very obvious trip wire to deter external threats to the nation.
So when you consider the plans of the competing presidential candidates, ask yourself this: What motivates my support of one plan over another? Do I just want this over because I'm tired of it all, or do I want us to make the effort to do this right so our presence today is appreciated by future generations of Iraqis, not regretted.
Thursday, May 24, 2007
Iraq, the ten year plan
Can an Adviser Model work as Plan B? At the grass roots, yes. An aggressive corps of advisers and their Iraqi brethren can prevent the country from cratering. However, stability in Iraq depends on two other factors. The first is the commitment to national unity on the part of the ministries and political parties. On May 17, Ambassador Ryan Crocker said, "What I see is an awareness and focus on the part of the Iraqi leadership that reconciliation is key to Iraq's success." Obviously, Crocker has to be proved right in his judgment. To date, the top Iraqi leadership has been much weaker—and more selfish—than the bottom.
The second factor is U.S. steadfastness. There is no full exit or abrupt departure without serious adverse consequences. "If you leave quickly, we'll redistribute our units and go back to where we have local support," Lt. Gen. Ali Ghaidan, commander of the Iraqi Ground Forces, told us in a recent interview. Such consolidation, which seems logical, is the adjustment President Nguyen Van Thieu tried to make in South Vietnam in 1975. But once South Vietnamese units began to pull out of the more remote areas, panic set in and events cascaded out of control. South Vietnam had a very experienced army; for the Iraqi army to try such adjusting—meaning, pulling out of the tough Sunni areas like Qaim or Fallujah—risks total chaos.
This war will be fought for another 10 years because there is no central authority controlling the extremist groups among the dozens of gangs that compose the Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias. This is a bottom-up war that will be fought out in dozens of cities, towns, and farming communities. The core strength of the Iraqi security forces lies at the battalion level of the army, which is the least sectarian institution in Iraq. These battalions, paired with police departments, are the key to the war. Left abruptly on their own, they would fall apart. Like Afghanistan—where we have 30,000 soldiers fighting and advising—Iraq is a commitment for a decade.
Is West's proposal for advisers the best plan? It may well be. Although I'd argue for a significant U.S. base in the Kurdish region of the country as well, just to make Iraq's neighbors think twice before doing anything rash.
Tuesday, May 22, 2007
Iraq, Iran, proxy wars, and a summer offensive
Iran is secretly forging ties with al-Qaida elements and Sunni Arab militias in Iraq in preparation for a summer showdown with coalition forces intended to tip a wavering US Congress into voting for full military withdrawal, US officials say."Iran is fighting a proxy war in Iraq and it's a very dangerous course for them to be following. They are already committing daily acts of war against US and British forces," a senior US official in Baghdad warned. "They [Iran] are behind a lot of high-profile attacks meant to undermine US will and British will, such as the rocket attacks on Basra palace and the Green Zone [in Baghdad]. The attacks are directed by the Revolutionary Guard who are connected right to the top [of the Iranian government]."
The official said US commanders were bracing for a nationwide, Iranian-orchestrated summer offensive, linking al-Qaida and Sunni insurgents to Tehran's Shia militia allies, that Iran hoped would trigger a political mutiny in Washington and a US retreat. "We expect that al-Qaida and Iran will both attempt to increase the propaganda and increase the violence prior to Petraeus's report in September [when the US commander General David Petraeus will report to Congress on President George Bush's controversial, six-month security "surge" of 30,000 troop reinforcements]," the official said.
Logically, this only makes sense. With congress's vacillation on the war, and with key dates being bandied about, it would only make sense that our most significant state enemy in the area, Iran, would work behind the scenes to try to drive us out of Iraq and claim the country as another of its vassals (see Syria). If Iran does ratchet up the violence this summer, the blood of many U.S. soldiers and Iraqis will be on the hands of a congress which has done nothing but act irresponsibly in a time of war.
Saturday, April 21, 2007
Enough incompotence to go around...
Wednesday, February 21, 2007
Bravo, Prince Harry
Prince Harry will almost certainly be deployed to carry out a tour of duty in Iraq, according to Whitehall sources.
The prince would be the first senior royal to serve on the front line since Prince Andrew in the Falklands in 1982.
His regiment, the Blues and Royals, is expected to be told it will serve in Iraq as part of the latest round of UK troop deployments.
Godspeed to Harry and all troops deploying to Iraq.